

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT **ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X w/ b att		
2	DDCI		X w/ b att		
3	EXDIR		X w/ b att		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X w/ att			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19					
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22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

STAT

DCI
EXEC
REG

D/ Executive Secretary
25 July 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

Along with this memo the following were returned to the DDI:

Professor David's Study

Critiques by the Political Instability Group
of Professor David's study

Draft study on "Warning Signs of Military Coups"
done by OGI

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Executive Registry

84- 2873 / 1

25 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Military Coup Analysis

1. This note follows up on my oral suggestion to you that some work be done on coups -- warning signs, defense, implications, and aftermaths.

2. On 3 July, having gotten my hands on two rather long papers on coups done by a Professor David of John Hopkins and my interest having been quickened by the Bolivian coup attempt of the weekend just past, I sent a note to Dick along with copies of the David papers suggesting they might be useful.

25X1 3. In response, I received a good and encouraging description of work
25X1 that was underway in OGI signed by [] Chief, Instability Branch. Attached to [] memo was a critique of David's paper which epitomized the "not invented here" syndrome. My notes on the appendix will indicate my annoyance at having David's effort come apart when I merely sent it along for its possible value. The fact is that David did do a lot of work on coups and an analyst with an open world instead of sailing into it would think in terms of learning from it and eliminating its deficiencies in doing the analysis I asked for.

4. I was pleased to see the draft study which Dick sent me on "Warning Signs of Military Coups." That's in the right direction but the analysis can be broadened and deepened. It makes a beginning in dealing with indicators. It is also necessary to go into techniques and methods, consolidating power, aftermaths, counter-coups. For this purpose David has selected a good array of examples (South Yemen, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Gabon, Iraq & others) to which should be added Guatemala, Bolivia, Thailand, and Dominican Republic.

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6. A problem can be made of definitions and destabilization, insurgencies and coups can run into each other. It may be difficult to identify what is developing and frequently no one will know which direction a situation will take or what the final outcome will be. That's why this can be valuable work for an instability center and why it can be useful for policymakers and station chiefs cultivating their liaison relationship in the Third World.

C
William J. Casey

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